Malaysian Youths on Twitter: Regulated Activism and Legislated Identity

by Ungku Luqman ‘Arifin Bin Ungku Azmi, University of Nottingham Malaysia

Abstract: Online activism through Twitter exercised by Malaysian youths is seemingly becoming prevalent in the present time. Activism in Malaysia, however, is governed with various regulations and censorship. This dissertation examines how repressive laws regulate online youth activism with the application and imposition of Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and the Sedition Act 1948. In turn, regulatory practices influence the creation of new representations and ways of being in a social order. Seeing online activism through order of discourse, I coin and comply with two new theories, “regulated activism” and “legislated identity”. In this study, activism, social order, and youth’s relations to another group are considered as a discourse. For regulated activism, I theorise how online activism is considered to be regulated, not only through regulations, but is reproduced as a conscious social practice to produce new discourses and meanings that reflect one’s identity. For legislated identity, I observe how Malaysian youths (specifically youth activists) position themselves within the regulated Malaysia environment and the impacts they make in the said environment. Through these theories, representation and formation of Malaysian youths are explored when they participate in online activism within a regulated cyberspace.

INTRODUCTION

Digital or online activism (can be used interchangeably) has been considered to be the current and future practices for political engagement (Sivitanides and Shah, 2011)—one at the forefront and particularly apt for the youths (Lim, 2013). This is not to say that the youths are increasingly becoming more interested in activism online, but the existence of digital media has, thus far, provide an extensive support for them to participate more in civic engagement (Lievrouw, 2011, p. 42; Bakardijeva, 2005; Best, 2005, Juris and Pleyers, 2009). Within the Malaysian context, the first student activism and youth-led movement dated back to the 1930s (Spector, 1956). From then on, there has been a steady increase in the visibility of youths’ positions in Malaysia’s social and political environment. The surge of social youth movements in Malaysia is developed through the usage of social media (Postill, 2014). This is reflective of the revolutionary digitalisation process which transformed conventional practices and activities to be inclusive of new media. New digital media, in this case, highly revolves around the Internet and social media. As youths are more predisposed towards using social media, they are more likely to be the main demographic to take part in online activism (Ida, Saud and Mashud, 2020). 

Youths are not reactive towards issues that are only pertinent to them exclusively. However, their responses through civic engagement are almost always about how they can represent and position themselves against issues that affect their identity as youths in the social and political environment. In September 2019, youths took part in the Global Climate Strike (Tee, 2019) in civil societies such as KAMY and Greenpeace Malaysia joined in solidarity and marched as part of the climate strike in Malaysia. Recently, Undi18 and youths of all ages gathered in front of the Parliament building to protest against the lack of effort by the government in lowering the voting age to 18 years old (Koya, 2021). The impacts that the youths made in Malaysian society, whether through activist organisations or individuals, are visible throughout the whole nation.

Malaysian youths’ involvement in political or social activism is known to be a catalyst, ultimately to push for a change in the social structure and/or political order in society (Gordon, 2009, p. 4-7; Sherrod et al., 2006). The amount of previous research on youth activism speaks to gravity in understanding and determining their impacts in both academic and reality. Weiss (2005, p. 287-332) and Altbach (1989, p. 97-110) are two exemplary scholars who have looked into youth activism and student mobilisation in Malaysia. Their reflections and theories are critical to this study when they first traversed the nuances of student activism. Furthermore, their differing studies connote a degree of similarity in terms of the impacts from student activism in Malaysia history. Despite any other forms of political or social activism, there is a connection to the broader issue of identity construction and nationalism.

Multiple research and studies in the past on youth activism, specifically on social media, have always looked at the perspective of social movement theory. This is true with studies done by Bisafar, Welles and Parker (2020); Earl, Maher and Elliot (2017); Cammaerts (2015); and Teruelle (2012). Within the scope of online activism, analysts, scholars and activists alike have explored the possibilities of various social or political activism that may arise or have been created on different social media platforms.

Online activism has been categorically defined in various manners. This is because the nature of online activism is inclusive of multiple communicative tools and digital technologies. These tools are operated differently based on their interfaces and features. Examples of digital activism comprise of electronic advocacy through mailing lists (Menon, 2000), cyber-activism (Illia, 2003), slacktivism (Rotman et al., 2011), tech activism (Padios, 2014), online mobilisation (Lusoli, Ward and Gibson, 2002), microblogging activism (Fedorenko and Sun, 2016), and others. For this study, every activism that falls within the scope of digital activism shall then be defined as an act of engaging in public discourse and reacting to socio-political and economic issues that are prevalent and/or critical in a society where the activity involves using digital technologies and new media.  This dissertation, however, will be focusing on social media activism, specifically, Twitter activism. Now, the media climate in Malaysia has pervaded regulations and censorship (Weiss, 2012; Davidson, 1998). However, Internet communication was thought to be relatively unregulated (Gan, Gomez and Johannen, 2004; Ferdinand, 2000), showing distinction between mainstream media and alternative media. The primary differences between the two are political, economic and cultural relationships to those in power (i.e. the government). In essence, mainstream media involves large commercial or state-run organisations whereas alternative media tend to be small and often linked to social movements, civil society organisations or weak opposition parties (George, 2007, p. 895). With regard to the statement, youths prefer to use alternative media or digital media for activism. Additionally, it is easier for them to practice their freedom of speech and freedom of expression, enshrined in the Federal Constitution under Article 10.

Offline activism is different from digital activism. They can be (re)produced in any form of media, such as reports, pictures, radio broadcasts, and printed media (Ginwright and Cammarota, 2007, p. 705). This prompts the application and practice of regulation and censorship laws which can have similar effects toward digital activism. Involvement from external influences that limit the full magnitude of democratic processes bears the question of whether any form of activism is regulated. So, how can Malaysian youths position and better represent themselves in a regulated environment and censored cyberspace when participating in online activism?

There is still much research yet to be done jointly on regulations and youth online activism. In order to do so, this thesis will espouse a theoretical framework which will examine the youths’ identities in relation to their power and impact to push for social and/or political changes in Malaysian society. Chapter 1 will dig deeper into the history of student activism, the constant increase of social movements and the evolution of youth activism pre and post-digitalisation. Chapter 2 will break down the theoretical framework employed for this thesis and explain the methodology that will be used to apply the theories onto case studies. Chapter 3 will then illustrate the regulatory influences on youth online activism and explore further the effects shouldered by the youths. Chapter 4 will continue to examine further how regulations and censorship limit and restrict social movements and bring about new social movements in the Malaysia digital era through new social movement theory. Chapter 5 shall then attempt to provide an answer to the question on how Malaysian youths can self-represent and intervene in state’s affair through online activism by applying the identity formation theory. The purpose of this study is to explore these theories, collocate them to real life events and apply the framework in order to capture the extent of the regulations towards youth online activism and ways to restore justice for youths. Although the theories will delve into the realm of psychology and law, it posits a framework to question an environment that has never been asked before.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Setting of Youth Activism in Malaysia

Youth activism in Malaysia has changed and was revolutionised throughout the decades (Weiss, 2011). However, such scope and background require understanding from the movement and traditional practices that are involved in the past which paved the way for a more controlled and democratic engagement in the contemporary Malaysian society that impacts the future of the youths. As previously stated, most studies done on youth activism adopted social movement theory. This theory is befitting as it is directly related to youths’ mobilisation within the Malaysia social and political environment. The academic standpoints for youth activism analysed and looked into the impacts on the political order and social structure that were necessary to go through changes. When focusing on social movements, a perspective on identity construction or identity formation is also presented (Fulham, 2017; Yates and Younis, 1999; Gregory 1998; Yates and Younis, 1998; Erikson, 1968). Gregory (1998, p. 18) stated that the collective identities of the youths are “formed and reformed through struggles in which the ‘winning of identification’, the articulation of collective needs, interests, and commitments itself are keys in the exercise of domination and resistance.”  As Malaysia is a diverse country, social movements always have a focal position in which researchers and scholars include social attributes such as race, religion, sexuality, gender and nationality, but none that considers the youth’s identity as a whole. By right, the intersections at play are significant in those rhetorics; supporting the foundation and processes for social interventions (Terriquez, Brenes and Lopez, 2018; Benford and Snow, 2000). That being said, youth activism affects the overall governance of democracy despite intersectionality. Hence, youth online activism is an entirely different scope to be scrutinised. Yet, there is less to no research done on the extent of Internet and media regulations and censorship that impede digital activism although Gan, Gomez and Johannen (2004) and Ferdinand (2000) argued that the Internet warrants better platforms for the youths to partake in democratic

processes, it should be noted that youths’ rights to uphold democracy in Malaysia is still limited. In this situation, a much needed discussion about the discrepancy in the relationship between the youths and the states will provide a better understanding on why such actions to limit and restrict mobilisation and civic engagement are continued. This discussion must also be inclusive of all aspects and roles shouldered by the necessary stakeholders (i.e. the government, the youths, policies and laws at play, and new/digital media).

2. Brief History of Student Activism

The history of student activism is rich with national influence which has forwarded the social movements or social advancement of changes in the Malaysian society. Student activism first occurred back in the 1930s during the period of colonial Malaya that addressed the debate between Malay radicalism and ethnic identities, largely Malayan Chinese students (Spector, 1956, p. 71-72). It was further developed into the status of non-Malays and the role of university, specifically Raffles University, that became the beacon in fighting for the students’ rights as Malayan citizens (Puthucheary, 1998, p. 172-173) in the late 1940s. 

In the 1950s, the progression of student activism became even more radical or transgressive which led to the 13 May 1954, also known as the 1954 National Service riots. Chinese students have been the main contributor to the rising of student activism, organising numerous “student riots, organised destruction and bloodshed” in Singapore and Peninsular Malaya (Spector, 1956, p. 65). The riot has been interpreted as a form of anti-colonial movement towards the British administration residing in Malaya and Singapore (Thum, 2013). Furthermore, in moving towards the liberation of Singapore, the Chinese students worked together with the Socialist Club members of the University of Malaya, students who have been identified as coming from China, India and Indonesia. This was made known as the Fajar Publication (University Socialist Club’s magazine), specifically on Issue 7, titled: “Aggression in Asia” was found in the Chinese High Schools (Loh, Liao, Lim and Seng, 2013). The Sedition Act was first introduced by the British government in 1948 under the Sedition Ordinance 1948 Act (Nain and Kim, 2004). The Fajar trial may be the first sedition case report in pre-Independence Malaya  (Loh, Liao, Lim and Seng, 2013) before it was revised in accordance with the 13 May 1969 (13 May incident) — “to ensure that certain constitutional provisions could not be questioned. … for this purpose the Sedition Act was amended making it illegal to raise sensitive issues by questioning the sovereignty of the Rulers …” (Funston, 1980, p. 214). Silverstein (1970, p. 11-12) looked into the effectiveness and education goals of colleges that were set by the Malayan government back in 1954 to complement the status of Malayan Chinese and Malayan Indian students to be equally leveled as Malays. 

This extensive timeline in the development of student activism in Malaysia, albeit summarised, is further theorised in Weiss (2011). Her exploration on student activism by using social movement theory as the main framework provides an in-depth understanding on youths’ stance as national citizens that advocates for legislative changes. However, Altbach (1989) argued that student involvement in politics was sporadic and the political system was not affected by it. Nonetheless, students engaged in activism despite coming from diverse backgrounds. This diversity was then used to give meaning to the notion of “Bangsa Malaysia” (Malaysian Citizens) (Weiss, 2011). The power the students had during those periods was able to hold the government accountable as they became the mediators in bridging the relationship between the general public and the government to articulate ideas of nationalism. 

3. Post-Independence of Students’ Social Movements 

The early 1960s were the time when student crackdown was considered to start. The government implemented Schools (Post-Secondary) Societies Regulations. It was a compilation of guidelines to regulate and control the mobilisation of student organisations in universities (Weiss, 2005). This was followed by the merger of Malaya with Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak which was seen as a ‘colonial conspiracy’ by radical left students (Silverstein, 1970). Their concerns were right as the government emulated the same requirements and tactics that were done by the Singapore government to limit and restrict political activism on campus. Nonetheless, these events spurred a larger, more visible student movement in Malaysia (Weiss 2005, p. 301). Student organisations became affiliated with similar issues; their apprehension towards ‘national unity and identity, loyalty, and the King…’ still continued on, but they started to be more concerned about how Malaysia would be seen in the world, national, social and economic issues, as well as how the students can play a part in these issues despite regulations on and off-campus by the government (Silverstein, 1970, p. 18). All of these concerns became apparent especially in post-Singapore’s separation in 1965. All the same between 1964-1968, political activism on campus was on the rise with the establishment of Speaker’s Corner on Universiti Malaya (UM) campus (Ibid. 16-17).

Student activism was the cornerstone to appeal for racial justices (Terriquez, Brenes and Lopez, 2018; Benford and Snow, 2000) during the 1969 general election. The opposition parties, Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia and Democratic Action Party (DAP) won with the help of students to campaign against Bumiputera privileges outlined by the Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. With the distribution of Manifesto Pelajar (Students’ Manifesto) and gaining larger support from communities to win against the government, the Bumiputera(s), largely right-wing Malays, started to show discouragement towards Tunku Abdul Rahman, believing that he had forfeited his status and gave more autonomy to the Chinese (Weiss, 2005). Anwar Ibrahim, leader of Persatuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti Malaya (PBMUM), took charge in organising demonstrations on campus to fight for maintaining the rights and privileges of the Bumiputera, upholding the Malay status and Bahasa Melayu (Malay language).

Student mobilisation and the upsurge of student activism became significant in the mid to late 1970s. Multiple universities were founded; the government was concerned about the increasing number of students in higher education (Weiss, 2005, p. 303). In order to prevent student activism and protests on campus, firstly, the Campus Investigative Committee was formed in 1970 under the National Operations Council. This was followed by the drafting of the University and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971 which was then passed by the Parliament on 18 March 1971 (Ibid.). This was the first official student crackdown in the history of student activism. Student movements were subdued after the 1975 amendments.

A new wave of activism started in the late 1990s (Weiss and Hassan, 2004) known as the Reformasi movement. Students took on a more active role in pushing for social and political changes against issues that affected them personally or the whole of Malaysia namely on human rights issues, democracy deprivation, political engagement, mobilisation within campus and ethnic barriers (Weiss, 2005). The difference between matters on and off-campus was noted but considered as equally important by the students. In other words, no issue was prioritised more than the other.

4. Evolution and Digitalisation of Youth Activism in Malaysia

In the present day, youth activism has evolved and digitalised. Advanced technology and rise in demands of new media changed social and cultural engagement in cyberspaces (Lievrouw, 2012, p. 472-475). Digital activism engenders a contemporary social movement that is unconventional for more direct and effective contesting practices in a new environment to contribute towards social changes (Tilly, 2008; Rogers 1962). Lim (2013) discovered how political participation and civic engagement are being perceived as a culture – and one that is considered as ‘popular’, particularly amongst youths in Malaysia in his study on youth activism using online sites.

Usage of the Internet social media for political activism has been increasing in Malaysia, primarily since 2011 and 2012 (Warren, Jaafar and Sulaiman, 2016). The Bersih movement (the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) is a prime example of a social movement that incorporated digital media as part of their activism. The general public was not aware of the movement of the first rally in 2007 (Radue, 2012). With the help of Facebook and Twitter, Bersih 2.0 rally constituted about ‘50-60% non-partisan and multiethnic’ participants (Ibid.) showing the movement’s visibility increased in social media sites. Facebook pages were created, Instagram posts were everywhere, Twitter hashtags (#) were created to promote the Bersih rally (Lim, 2016). Similar to social movements that have been presented in the previous heading (see Literature Review, p. 10-11), the Bersih movement was led by the youths. This showcases how digital media can be used to alleviate democratic processes for the youths. 

5. Tech and Digital Activism 

Social media are not the only platforms that can be used for political activism. In fact, other digital media platforms have been effectively utilised for communication tools and civic engagement in multiple countries. 

In Colombia, activists helped the U’Wa people from being forcibly displaced by the Colombian military troops (Meisner, 2000). They used email and mailing lists to spread awareness of the military action towards the U’Wa people. Quick and direct, over 30 demonstrations were organised around the world to stand in solidarity.

Similarly in Africa, an NGO called Fahamu employed a method of using mobile text messaging (SMS) technology (Asuncion-Reed, 2010) helped the NGO in providing information to the public on their advocacy, promoting ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. During this time, African citizens would receive message alerts on the campaign’s progress. It was effective primarily because the SMS alert service was free. The outcome from this movement was the reaching of the goal by 15 countries in the African Union, moving towards ratifying the protocol. 

Digital activism in the Philippines was an interesting occurrence. During the presidential election in 2004, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo faced national consequences for her blatant poll fraud to achieve the presidency (Padios, 2014). A voice recording of her conversing with the Southern Election Commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano (Garci), circulated throughout the whole of the Philippines. The general public quickly realised that the voice in the recording was Arroyo. The conversation was about the number of votes she would have at the end of the voting period, demanding that she take lead against her opposition. TXTPower (an advocacy group for mobile phone users) released a free for download ringtone that contained the recording of Garci-Arroyo remixed with “In Da Club”, a hip-hop song. The ringtone was constantly remixed with various other songs, and on the TXTPower site, there were about twenty different remixes. This advocacy movement gained traction locally and internationally. Media from all around the world became aware of the ringtones (Ibid.)

6. Twitter and Youth Activism 

Twitter is popular amongst social media users to engage, connect, but most importantly, micro-blog — producing short and concise posts describing the current situation or status of a user (Larsson and Moe, 2012). Similar to other social media platforms, Twitter is evolving and expanding to be used for political engagement and activism. As stated by Winston (1998), communication methods and devices are increasingly being utilised outside of their intended means of usage. It is shown that the global Twitter demography by age distribution as of January 2021, Twitter users within the age group of 13-34 years old (i.e. youths) constitute up to 60% (Tankovska, 2021).

In order to understand the extent of their involvement on Twitter, the interfaces, features, and ways of using the platform should be first observed and analysed. An interaction that occurs on Twitter can be both a one-way or a two-way communication: 1) a one-way interaction (i.e. a tweet) is described as a Singleton (Kwak et al., 2010), reflecting a statement made by a user with no further communication with other users; 2) a two-way communication includes a mention, a retweet, quote tweets, or a reply between two or more other Twitter users.

When it comes to activism, the Twitter cyberspace can be used as a platform for civic engagement and political participation — prime temporal examples primarily happened during election periods, including but not limited to political microblogging in 2010 Swedish election campaign (Larsson and Moe, 2012), political rumouring during 2012 U.S. presidential election (Shin et al., 2017), and Twitter modelling 2011 Spanish presidential election campaign (Borondo et al., 2012). 

CHAPTER 2: FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

1. Theoretical Framework

There is a sequence to the theoretical framework constructed for this thesis. One theory affects the other, and a progression follows. Firstly, regulatory theory by Braithwaite and Parker (2003) will be applied to examine the regulatory practices in Malaysia. They consider regulations and censorship as ‘influencing the flow of events’. To deconstruct how these regulations will affect ‘events’, which in this case, would be online youth activism albeit the repressive media law in Malaysia will be dissected. The laws are looked in their true form (i.e. how they are structured and written) and ways the government impose these laws onto individuals. There are two aspects under regulatory theory that are pertinent within this framework: 1) responsive regulation; and 2) restorative justice. Responsive regulation is the method undertaken by civil societies to ensure the government does not abuse their power and control (Braithwaite, 2017). On the other hand, restorative justice is the belief that governance should be responsive towards regulations and censorship (Braithwaite and Parker, 2003). However, it will be looked at through the perspective of the youths. These two aspects will, then, be merged into the other two theories. 

These merges will be coined into two terms, which are formulated by this study: “regulated activism” and “legislated identity”. 

Regulated Activism. As youth activism tends to produce social movements in a nation, thus, the second theory will explore how online activism will create new social movements instead. Similarly to how student activism in the past was constantly regulated, censored and controlled (see Literature Review, p.9-12), online activism is also under surveillance by the government. Thus, it can be assumed that activism is regulated. This term is applicable to offline activism. Drawing inspiration from Buechler (1995), his perspectives provide a profound insight on the difference between the act of transgression or activism. This activity has an underlying intention towards resolving political, economic and/or social issues, whether through changes that can be materialised or intangible impacts. 

New social movements should constantly be scrutinised, especially with the involvement of digital media. As Buechler argues for his theories, culture is referred to as the root cause that characterises and forms new social movements. The role of culture, in his argument, is one that connects and engages with people to advocate for better development, whether individually, in a group, an organisation or institution, or society in general. 

Combining with responsive regulation, youth online activism warrants new social movements and these movement cultures emphasise the changes on social order that is related to identity, culture, ideology and politics. Regulated activism shall be considered as one of the new social movements which in turn, is developed into a culture within the Malaysian society. 

Legislated Identity. The final theory on identity construction or formation by Tajfel and Turner (1979) will be espoused. This theory provides a perspective on how the youths can position themselves in a regulated environment when participating in online activism. Youths can exercise their rights to freedom of speech, expression and movement to counter government’s control and regulations. This movement is known as restorative justice. 

As online political activism also looks into youth identities that are reflective of their social backgrounds, thus their political participation and (re)construction of identity is considered to be legislated. This is primarily because their mobilisation in social movements is not entirely free. Hence, this is why this thesis categorised such construction of identity called legislated identity. 

2. Methodology

This study believes that using critical discourse analysis by Fairclough (1995) will provide a more inclusive procedure in understanding the extent of Malaysian youths’ reactions and their impacts towards the socio-political situation in society, especially towards the government. The language that the youths use when reacting on Twitter creates diverse discourse. It ultimately constitutes one subject: politics. 

In contextualising order of discourse, Fairclough (2001) stated that online youth activism is seen as a discourse. This discursive approach breaks down online activism as a social practice, materialising imaginary social lives into reality and a new representation. Social practice will first be analysed in Chapter 3, parallel with regulatory theory. Regulatory practices are the “order”. Order is a dominant aspect (Ibid.). Initially, order was considered to be only representational, existing as a dialectical relationship between the discourse and the social practice. However, online activism rejects this notion and brings about new social changes and practices within a regulated environment. Chapter 4 and 5 will angle the order of discourse to focus on new social practice and lives, and identity formation as a new representation. 

3. Case studies

The five-years political proceedings in Malaysia from 2016 to 2020 have undergone multiple administrations. Prior to the general election 13 (GE13) in May 2018, Barisan Nasional (BN) was still serving as the federal government. Post-general election 13, Pakatan Harapan (PH), a political coalition which consisted of Democratic Action Party (DAP), People’s Justice Party (PKR) and National Trust Party (AMANAH), became the ruling coalition (New Straits Times, 2018) for 22 months until February 2020 (New Straits Times, 2020). Then, Tun Mahathir, former Prime Minister for PH, resigned. Malaysia once again experienced democracy deprivation and a political crisis when PH collapsed (Ufen, 2021). Known as the Sheraton Move (Langkah Sheraton), PH was ousted when Perikatan Nasional (PN) took over in March 2020. PN has now been called the “backdoor government” (Head, 2020).

These proceedings will be the main timeline for the case studies. However, there is a bit of leniency towards the analysis. To ensure that there are sufficient and relevant findings, cases that are not within the main timeline shall be considered — primarily for the year 2015 and 2021. The multiple governance changes during this period will extensively showcase the difference in media governance and the state’s involvement in the communication industries. 

Five different individuals will be used as case studies. These individuals were chosen because they have histories in being charged under repressive media laws for practicing freedom of speech and participating in advocacy and activism and hence, were not  chosen at random. These cases were reported and the general public were aware of their actions. Their activism on Twitter was made visible as a few news media published articles on their cases. These individuals range from self-proclaimed human rights activists to Members of the Parliament to ordinary Malaysian citizens. Their involvement only on Twitter itself has led them to be prosecuted or charged shall be used for further analysis and discussion. Their activism includes making statements, producing specific types of media contents such as images and videos, or directly interacting with government officials. For this study, the age range of youths will be those who are under 39 years old. 

3.1. Fahmi Reza

The infamous graphic designer and human rights activist, Fahmi Reza has repeatedly been the subject of political dissent. The most effective method for him to raise awareness on human rights violations in Malaysia is through his cartoons and graphics. When it comes to his identity as a Malaysian, he is quick to respond on subject matters that are against his beliefs and opinions. Some of his works are considered satire. One of his prominent graphics that made him vulnerable to judicial charges was his depiction of Najib Razak as a clown (Hamdan, 2018). Although he was first indicted by posting the image on Facebook, he purposely disseminated it on Twitter to repudiate the abuse of the Sedition Act. Fahmi increasingly used Twitter for activism specifically for the Sheraton Move and even created a movement in fighting against the COVID-19 under the #KitaJagaKita (Mei Zi, 2020). At the time of writing this dissertation, Fahmi was arrested for alleged sedition by creating a playlist that undermined the statement,”Dengki ke?” (Envious much?), that was made by the Queen, Raja Permaisuri Agong Tunku Hajah Azizah towards another Instagram comment under her post (Zack, 2021). A hashtag (#) conversations on Twitter, #DengkiKe, looked into the position of the royal family and the possibility of them receiving the vaccines without proper acknowledgement by the citizens. For Fahmi Reza, his cases are looked into because he was a youth. However, he is no longer considered as one in the present. 

3.2. Michelle Yesudas

Michelle Yesudas has been in the legal and activism industry since 2011. She co-founded and was the Campaign Coordinator for Lawyers for Liberty (LFL). Michelle has been crowned the winner of The Edge Inspiring Young Leaders Awards for her work on freedom of expression, law reform, the treatment of refugees and the death penalty. Similarly to Fahmi, she was arrested under the Sedition Act back in March 2015 following her tweet towards rape and death threats that were made against a BFM presenter on the topic of hudud (Islamic law) (Gartland, 2015). She tweeted, “… I am positively terrified that these crazy, rape frenzied people are actually the majority in my country.” The Inspector-General of Police (IGP) made a threat via Twitter to summon her for questioning. In fact, the comments that were made by Michelle was a form of online activism. She questioned the authority at play regarding his power in supposedly to stop the prevalent rape cases and online death threats in Malaysia. However, her statements were misconstrued—no correlations or specifications to any races or genders in Malaysia—by the IGP as he was afraid that she would cause an uprising amongst Malaysians. 

3.3. Khalid Ismath

A human rights defender, a social and political activist and former Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM) Youth Chief, Khalid Ismath has an unwavering drive in pushing for changes in the Malaysian society on various aspects. Khalid has been arrested multiple times in the past. In 2012, he was involved in a political protest with the Bersih 3.0 rally. In 2015, Khalid allegedly posted ‘offensive’ comments on his social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) regarding the abuse of power by government authorities and police officers in which he was also accused of insulting the Johor Royal Family. He was charged for 11 counts under Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and 3 counts under Section 4(1)(b) of the Sedition Act 1948. In 2019, he was once again investigated for sedition and remanded for alleged tweet towards the Queen, Permaisuri Agong. However, he denied that his tweet was directed to the Queen, but was accused as there were pictures of him circulated on social media (Palansamy, 2019).

3.4. Hannah Yeoh

The Member of the Parliament for Segambut and former Deputy Minister of Women, Family and Community Development (KPWKM) under the PH government, Hannah Yeoh has always been vocal about issues that are related to gender. Although Hannah is a politician, in this case, she has been a victim of sedition and defamation herself. There were multiple occasions where she made statements in the past that were re-quoted through images in a more defamatory and seditious way. Previously, back on 11 March 2020, there was an image circulating on Facebook and Twitter that included a fake statement attributed to Hannah. The statement was trying to defame the Muslim community and the current Deputy Minister of KPWKM, Siti Zailah who is a member of the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) regarding the legality of child marriages in Malaysia. Following that occurrence, she was questioned at the Royal Malaysian Police Headquarters, Bukit Aman (Ar, 2020). Although she was no longer considered as the suspect for the fake statement investigation, she could have been charged under Section 4(1) of the Sedition Act 1948, Section 505(c) of the Penal Code and Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1988.

3.5. Muazz Ishak

A self-proclaimed activist, a university student and an anti-imperialist, Muazz has made his presence on Twitter stark and clear. He expressed his views and dissented against Malaysia as a capitalist country. Muazz was previously charged under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 Section 233(1)(a) in April 2021 (Free Malaysia Today, 2021). His sentences were based on his explicit tweets towards His Royal Highness Crown Prince of Johor, Tunku Ismail Idris and the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM). The defendant’s lawyer applied to lower the bail to RM2,500 on the grounds that Muazz is still a student and does not receive income through any means. Muazz was released with the court setting his bail to RM3,000 and he has to report to Pantai police station every two weeks.

CHAPTER 3: REGULATORY AND ORDER OF DISCOURSE

Regulatory practices can influence how an event would proceed (Braithwaite and Parker, 2003) which can exist in various forms (Hynninen, 2013). Looking into the context of Malaysia, regulatory practices towards online youth activism are mainly through the imposition of repressive laws towards individuals. Political and social activism facilitates the mobilisation of these groups to achieve the rights and privileges that they were previously promised (Grasso et al., 2019) enshrined within the Federal Constitution. With the existence of repressive laws, activism on Twitter tends to be more self-regulated and self-monitored (Calveras, Ganuza and Llobet, 2007). This is to avoid being seen as a ‘challenger’ towards the government who has the power to abuse the CMA and the Sedition Act. 

Based on the case studies, there are primarily two laws that have been presented multiple times. They are Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) 1998 and Sedition Act 1948. For the former, all of the chosen individuals either have been investigated or charged under Section 233 of the CMA, specifically Section 233(1)(a) and the latter,  Section 4(1). This study was previously considered by the law as draconian due to its nature of being ambiguous and entirely up to the prosecutor or court’s interpretations in practice thus, has a wide scope of liability. Both read in the respective manner: 

“233. A person who--(a) by means of any network facilities or network service or applications service knowingly; (i) makes, creates or solicits; and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion or other communication which is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person.”  

“4. (1) Any person who--a) does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do, or conspires with any person to do, any act which has or which would, if done, have a seditious tendency; (b) utters any seditious words; (c) prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes or reproduces any seditious publication; or (d) imports any seditious publication.”

The legal definition for s.233, specifically “… annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person” is not absolute. In other words, there is no proper measurement in identifying how the production of online activism, which is through tweets, can fall under the definition. Furthermore, through a sociolinguistic approach, any words that have no intentions or connotations of being seditious can still be considered as one; as long as it has correlations to the royal family or authorities, anyone can be held liable for the words that they speak in real life or on social media. Having said that, the word “utter” is not extensively defined. Since the action of uttering has to involve audible sounds, tweets produced that may or may not have seditious or defamatory meaning should not fall under the Sedition Act. 

In conceptualising regulatory practices as an order of discourse, social activity within these practices can be seen as limited or marginal. Order, in this case, is a dominant aspect (Fairclough, 2001). The languages or words that are used in the CMA and Sedition Act constitute a discourse that governs online activism. It is reflected in the government-activist relationship whereby the government maintains these laws to be ambiguous. Social practice by the activist only exists as dialectical which means when participating in online activism, the products (i.e. the tweets) are in the order of discourse instead of ‘oppositional, or alternative’ (Ibid. p. 2). However, the individuals from the case studies are accounted for as a discourse that is oppositional from the regulatory practices. Hence, they were investigated or charged under the laws. On the other hand, discourses can also represent social lives. In this analysis, the social lives will mirror the individuals’ lives in a regulated cyberspace in producing new representations. 

For Fahmi’s case, his depiction of Najib Razak was believed to be uncalled for. However, his representation of the graphic was true to himself. The clown caricature was a form of protest by Fahmi against Najib regarding the financial and investments scandal that he was overseeing, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). 

Fahmi has significant influence and has made a huge presence within the Malaysian society. Youths, especially those on Twitter, have been following and supporting his work in advocating against injustices. On 31 January 2016, Fahmi tweeted, 

“In 2015, the Sedition Act was used 91 times. Tapi dalam negara yang penuh dengan korupsi, kita semua penghasut.” (In a country full of corruption, we’re all seditious.) 

– @kuasasiswa

When analysing his tweet and the clown caricature, his political activism does not fall short of absolute truth while staying somewhat entertaining to consume and understand. “We’re all seditious” is a very powerful statement to be made in Malaysia. When positioning his activism within regulatory practices, there is no dominating aspect in his relationship with the government (Fairclough, 1992) — seemingly how the government has more control over his actions. When Fahmi was charged under the Sedition Act and CMA, that is the discourse aspect. The government influences how social practice in a social order should function.  An interesting aspect of Fahmi’s clown depiction is the direct ordering in producing meaning on how the governance system in Malaysia is — it is oppositional to the social structuring and his position against the government (Fairclough, 2001, p. 6). His statement showcases how difficult it can be to be living in a regulated and censored society. As the clown can be referred to as someone who acts in a comical way, Najib as the former Prime Minister during the BN administration in 2016, he essentially uttered that Malaysian was governed by officials who were not taking the status quo seriously. In other words, he has disrupted the social order when his activism is seen as an attack towards the government. The semiotic difference in what the government was seeing and the meaning that he was producing constituted the order of discourse. But, these differences are not always received well. 

Echoing similar sentiments, Khalid Ismath and Muazz Ishak did the same. For Khalid, he was accused of insulting the Queen in 2019. His remand was based on a thread together with other 3 individuals that were involved in the “seditious” act. The tweets can no longer be tracked. However, images of the tweets following the Queen’s Twitter deactivation can be found. 

“Mari mulakan pagi anda dengan perkara berfaedah.” (Start your day with something beneficial.)

– @frdsasrf (11 September 2019)

Attached with the tweet are screenshots of the Queen and her daughter, Tengku Puteri Afzan’s deactivated Twitter accounts. 

“Syabas dan tahniah. Salute.” (Well done and congratulations.) 

– @khalidismath (11 September 2019)

The tweet was regarding the Queen. However, there was no intention of it being seditious and defamatory towards the targeted “victim”. Khalid was put in this situation of being under police investigation for a photo attributed to him with troubling tweets to the Queen. The allegations against Khalid were denied and the picture has been confirmed to be fake. But the Queen and her daughter’s accounts deactivation arguably was caused by Khalid’s activism — although the Queen debunked that rumour. “It’s a free country,” she said. “Free” is questionable after the arrests, investigations and pressed charges towards individuals and Fahmi for their freedom to express opinions. 

Meanings on similar topics can be produced and reproduced differently when considering order of discourse (Fairclough, 2001). As dialectical as discourse can be, the relationship between language and society may be seen as two-way. Society influences language; language shapes society (Gee and Green, 1998). Thus, language in social relation against regulatory order (i.e. the Sedition Act) will always uphold those who have more power. “Free” through the Queen’s perspective is produced differently compared to activists. The discourse on freedom is socially constituted against social relations and social order (Fairclough, 1995, p. 134). The practice produced based on the discourse cannot be consumed similarly because it is socially constituted. 

This is similar to Muazz’s language towards Tunku Idris and the PDRM. 

“@HRHJohorII this video is a [REDACTED] for you showing off your exploitation gain, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED].”

“Dear police the very class traitor, shut the [REDACTED] up. Just stand still and watch the rakyat (people) dismantle and abolish the monarchy, the state and the police one day, okay?”

– @muazzishak (5 February 2021)

Muazz’s oppositional social practice was clear (Fairclough, 2001). The tweets consisted of vulgar words which have been redacted. There is a clear intention of being defined under s.233(1)(a) of CMA. In any situation, notwithstanding whether the individual that sent these tweets, are a part of the Monarchy or government officials/authorities, the words can offend someone. However, it does not justify his previous arrest. The only justification is warranted by regulatory practices, allowing social order to govern his activism.  In Muazz’s case, the discourse produced tried to push for changes in the status quo. His practice was to shed light on order (i.e. the Monarchy and institutions) and using language to shape society, serving as a ‘mediator’ to influence the social order, but to no avail (Fairclough, 1995). “… showing off your exploitation gain,.” looks at institutions at its core as order governs and controls status quo with its regulatory practices, the discourse through their actions on how much they have “influenced” society against activists are not on an equal level. It is within the social order even when it is not democratic or rightfully just, but when disrupted, other subjects (including Muazz, Khalid and Ismath) had to face the consequences (Duncan, 2017). Muazz posted his apologies on Twitter after being remanded. Yet, he still has the same beliefs as he had before. Activism exists as a discourse despite regulatory practices (Fairclough, 1995). 

For Michelle Yesudas and Hannah Yeoh, their tweets were either misconstrued or simply were not theirs in the first place. 

“Because I am positively terrified that these crazy, rape-frenzied people are actually the majority in my country.”

  – @MichelleYesudas (20 March 2015)

“What will happen to our national road map to fight child marriages with the appointment of MP from PAS as deputy minister of @KPWKM?”

– @hannahyeoh (9 March 2020)

Discourse on the produced tweets by Hannah and Michelle were based on an observation towards Malaysia’s social order. Their practice was not intended to structure language to disrupt social order, but the authorities perceived the meanings differently (Fairclough, 2001). The social relations between Michelle, Hannah and the government mainly focused on racial backgrounds. BN was the government in 2015, fast forward, PN has been the current government since March 2020. The similarity between the two governments is that both are Malay-Muslims majority political coalitions. Therefore, the social order in Malaysia revolving around being an Islamic country is debatable (Saravanamuttu, 2010; Moten, 2003). That is to say the application of CMA and the Sedition Act unto Hannah and Michelle on the basis that they were creating unrest in the society and attacking the majority of Malaysia’s population (Malay-Muslims) is regulatory practice functioning in a social order. They were projecting a ‘possible states of affairs’ (Fairclough, 2001) but social relations in Malaysia as a diverse country abide by what are constituted in the Federal Constitution. Despite Hannah and Michelle’s status of being an MP and a lawyer respectively, racial disparity has always been an issue in Malaysia (Sani, 2008). 

As stated by Braithwaite and Parker (2003), flow of events can be influenced and governed by regulatory practices. In this chapter, the events were influenced. Activism on Twitter by the individuals is a part of an order of discourse. This is a reflection on how social order networked together with opposing discourse. For social order to function without any disruption, regulatory practices are sanctioned. The Malaysian government maintains draconian laws in order to govern online activism. This social practice constitutes a different discourse, social relations and social order (Fairclough, 2001). These differences led to the imposition and abuse of CMA and the Sedition Act. 

CHAPTER 4: REGULATED ACTIVISM

Online activism as a social practice can create new social movements (Buechler, 1995). Through order of discourse, this social practice is first seen as imaginary (Fairclough, 1992). However, this imagination can be materialised. Breaking down online activism through a discursive approach, new social lives can take shape from the social practice. This chapter will explore how new social movements are brought forth through online activism.  Activism on Twitter must be considered to see how language can affect the current social order and social lives. Through this, new social movements can be measured. The social relations between individuals, the society and government are within the order of discourse (Fairclough, 2001). Online activism constitutes the construction of new social identities, affecting the current social relations and disrupting old systems of norms and beliefs. To note, new social movements do not necessarily have to be a positive movement. Buechler (1995) states that conflicts and interests within groups are not ‘structurally determined’. Instead, new social movements are liable to poke at the fragility of constructing collective identities. Under this chapter, new social movements revolving around activism — will be addressed as a responsive regulation against the government whereas order constitutes the social movement being regulated. Henceforth, the term regulated activism ensues. 

Fahmi’s clown depiction of Najib Razak existed beyond and against the dominant order of the regulatory practices. Even being under constant surveillance, he managed to create movements (either overt or subliminal) that put the government on edge. His regulated activism is used to his advantage (Gusfield, 1994) and in 2020, particularly for #KitaJagaKita. Fahmi essentially created a new social life from the Twitter community to reflect his regulated activism. The #KitaJagaKita movement connected NGOs, activists and human rights defenders, and ordinary Malaysians in raising funds and channelling them back to vulnerable groups that struggled during the Movement Control Order (MCO) in March 2020. It was a new social movement. Those who donated funds (depending on the donated amount) to the movement were gifted a personal art by Fahmi — including Najib’s clown caricature that was requested by an individual. Fahmi materialised his regulated online activism and influenced the flow of changes in the offline world (Fairclough, 2001). Now, this is considered a new social life because his regulated activism which caused him to be investigated and charged in the past is observed to push for positive social changes in Malaysian society (Cohen, 1985).

In Khalid’s case, it was the opposite of Fahmi’s new social movement creation. With the Queen’s deactivation, the Twitter community launched #AmpunTuanku. It was a hashtag movement to request for the Queen’s account to be reactivated. Khalid was considered to be a part of the discourse in being seditious towards the Queen although all allegations have been denied. His presence was clear as he was interacting with other individuals in reacting to the Queen’s deactivation endeavour. As previously stated, new social movements as part of activism are not entirely positive (Buechler, 1995). Through order of discourse, individuals who partaken in the #AmpunTuanku movement were a part of a “new” social life (Fairclough, 2001). New because after Khalid’s regulated activism, the community provided support to the Queen. It is a manner of discourse as their support is within the ordering of social relations, one that strengthens the dominant order (Ibid. p. 2). This is similar to Muazz in which there were more people who were against his language and activism on Twitter. Ironically, this imaginary practice is reproduced and materialised differently in the present. With the #DengkiKe new Twitter social movement in April 2021, succeeded by Fahmi, the Queen again became the subject of order. The flow of events was similar in the past with the Queen deactivating her account albeit for different reasons. Regulated activism produces the same meanings on the subject. Nevertheless, the practice is recontextualised based on different social relations and situations (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). In turn, there is a contrasting effect on the meanings consumption. 

For Hannah and Michelle, the discourse surrounds the topics of race and religion. In Malaysia, the identity of Malay and Muslim are the dominant aspects in social ordering (Fairclough, 2001) primarily because they are the majority and the Federal Constitution provides them greater privileges compared to other races and religions. The different social relations of both individuals in Malaysian society are much clearer. Discourse on Malay-Muslims became the main subject. When they produced tweets to situate themselves among the existing social life and in a regulated environment to question the current social order, their regulated activism resonated with other individuals who are in the same social relations as they are (Fairclough, 1992). Through this, the production of discourse positions the institution’s social order against Hannah and Michelle’s social relations. Their language materialised imaginary Malaysia and how it can be, creating new social lives through their regulated activism (Fairclough, 2001; Buechler, 1995). Other individuals became supportive of their activism, albeit not only on Twitter. Both individuals alongwith the Twitter community and those who are within the same social relations as they strive to achieve political and social changes in accordance to their identities.  To conclude, regulated activism tends to influence the general society (i.e. social relations through order of discourse) in creating new movements against the government (i.e. the social order). The individuals’ regulated activism affects the social order in various ways, but the subject matter is reflective of how Malaysia’s governance system kept pushing different individuals to participate in regulated activism (Fairclough, 2001).

CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATED IDENTITY

The final application from the sequential theoretical framework will be identity construction or formation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Through order of discourse, Fairclough (2001) believes social practices can bring about new representations; online activism is a way of establishing new representations in a social environment. These representations can be formed and positioned through a discoursal perspective, but shall be coined under the term “legislated identity”. This chapter will explore how Malaysian youths can position themselves within a regulated environment (or regulated cyberspace) to counter regulatory practices when participating in online activism.

In the previous chapters, social relations within a social environment are argued to consistently follow social orders (Fairclough, 2001). Online activism done by the case studies individuals are represented in discourse where it was enacted. It means that the communications between the individuals and the government affect the social order, arguing it as producing oppositional meaning to the current social practice (Ibid. p. 4). This meaning, in turn, is inculcated to create new representations, or can be considered as new identities. The representations or in this case the discourse are not inculcated. However, there is a possibility that they have yet to be fully formed and positioned in the social order. In other words, it is a form of restorative justice reflected in regulatory theory (Braithwaite and Parker, 2003). 

From Fahmi’s actions, his youth identity is represented through his offline activism. He has done advocacy back in 2012 for higher education reform at the Dataran Merdeka. His new representation is through his online activism. Regulatory practice influences how his online activism can affect the social order (Braithwaite and Parker, 2003). As far as regulations constitute how he should be governed in Malaysia for his social practice, he was able to produce new representations. New meaning to youth identity not only himself but Malaysian youths, or Malaysians, in general in discourse (Fairclough, 2001). Reflecting his clown depiction and relating it to the #KitaJagaKita, the discourse revolves around how he is able to (re)structure the social order by applying his activism to the general public for a more positive cause. In essence, everyone was able to be depicted as a clown should they choose for Fahmi to represent them to be. This new representation can be seen as a social practice against the social order. It is “us” (the youths) against “them” (the government) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In spite of that, it is also “us” positioning together with “them”, particularly when the clown depiction is regarded as seditious. Then, everyone is being seditious and a victim of sedition; “… we’re all seditious,” as Fahmi said. Thus, the inculcation of new representations by Fahmi’s identity formation in Malaysia created a new discourse of Malaysian youth identity and what it could be (Fairclough, 2001; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Self-representation of Hannah and Michelle are among other social relations that fall under the minority relation. Discourses related to their identity reflect a more racial aspect. Social order against them or for them are different compared to Fahmi, Khalid and Muazz. Their identity is a more of a subject of contest (Skevington and Baker, 1989; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Their social practice as a discourse is arguably more limited (Fairclough, 2001) — although in CMA and the Sedition Act there is no indication of any social relations towards race, religion, gender, and various others. The way they produce new representations is through how they position themselves as an MP and as a lawyer respectively in going against the majority and their social order. In other words, the “imagined” Malaysia’s social environment is constructed to emphasise on the inclusion of minority groups (Ibid. p.3). It is not materialised, but it can be inculcated. To produce new representations and construct new identities, they need to focus on creating changes in the social environment that are oppositional to the current social order. They have done just that; authorities believed that they would ‘create unrest’ among their social relations against the minority and shift the order of discourse to focus on new meanings (McPhail, Ferguson and Adams, 2016). The discourse previously focused on the social relations of the majority (Malay-Muslims) offline and online that constitute to the social order of sanctioning child marriages and normalising rape. Hannah and Michelle’s online activism on Twitter ‘enact’ new representations to produce new discourse and position themselves within that discourse. This discourse is then acted based on Malaysian youths’ identities constructed to counter the social order and rejecting the notion of social relations, despite regulatory practices. New representations through Hannah and Michelle’s social practice constitute legislated identities (Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough, 1995). 

In the case of Muazz and Khalid, their online activism is against the Monarchy and the PDRM. Orders that revolve around the two entities are not only complied with the Federal Constitution, but regulatory practices are stricter towards individuals who go against them. Even having political dissidents towards the Monarchy (specifically the Queen and HRH Tunku Idris) do not discount their activism to not have an effect in the society (Weiss, 2011; Fairclough, 2001; Altback, 1989). Legislated identities are constructed through new discourse; norms and beliefs in the current social relations constantly change. Previous perceptions by the general public oppose Muazz and Khalid’s social practice. However, the orders that are performed by the two entities may not necessarily reach the expectations of any social relations (i.e. Malaysians in general). This leads to a new enactment of representations (Fairclough, 2001) although not entirely caused by both individuals. Through their perspectives as Malaysian youths, they are more inclined to question orders that do not reflect their ideals (Weiss, 2005). Their activism is a form of questioning the position and relations of the Monarchy, government authorities and law enforcers against or with other social relations. It was not received well by other Malaysians initially. In time, order of discourse influenced these social relations to perceive and consume the meaning of Muazz and Khalid’s practice in a more pragmatic manner (Fairclough, 2001). Thus, legislated identities are formed, and they position themselves against “them” (the entities stated) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This position accentuates Malaysian youths to see the social order and try to reconstruct it to include themselves in a “new” order, a new way of living. 

This chapter has broken down the process of Malaysian youths in positioning themselves in a social order (a regulated environment, whether governed by regulatory practices, or with the existence of higher authorities that influence the practices of social relations). The case studies individuals have showcased how they are able to produce new meanings to their legislated identities and affect other individuals or youths to constantly produce a new discourse about the current order.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has considered how Malaysian youths can construct, form and position their identities in a strict social order. The theoretical framework and case studies individuals attested to this formation and situation of youths in a regulated environment. With the question that was posed in the Introduction, I have attempted to position myself as a Malaysian youth and determine the ways to form my own identity and situate it in a regulated environment whenever I engage in online activism. With the framework that I have presented, I believe this study has exemplified such endeavour not only for myself, but for other Malaysian youths.

Theories from the sequential framework can be seen to affect and influence one another. Likewise, similar to discourse, there is no proper measuring equipment that could be utilised for the social and political changes that are created and pushed for in Malaysia. Through order of discourse, construction of new youth identity, one that is considered as a legislated identity in the theoretical framework, is enacted and can be inculcated to a certain extent. The changes observed in the social order among different social relations can be taken as a value to showcase the impact of Malaysian youths, specifically youth activists have in the society. It should be noted that as a discourse, activism as a social practice alone will not be able to produce changes overnight. Similar to discourse, relationships between Malaysian youths and the government, representations of groups, status quo, and ways of living are constantly changing with new meanings and new orders. Thus, as far as changes can be seen, both positively and negatively, they do not last once the discourse is normalised and marginalised.

This study should not be considered as conclusive to observe and measure how Malaysian youths construct and represent their identities through online activism. One aspect from the research question that was accounted for but not emphasised to a greater extent is Twitter. I did not consider its functionalities, communicative tools, and communities and followers’ engagement further. Future studies on similar topics should stress Twitter as a cyberspace that is used for online activism and how it affects social order.

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