Well Begun is Half Done: Progressing Towards Interoperability in ASEAN’s Digital Trade Standards

by Foo Hui Yann, National University of Singapore

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Abstract: With the expansion of global digital trade, it is likely that the harmonisation of standards or regulations can serve to facilitate digital trade. I pinpoint barriers to achieving interoperability of digital trade standards in ASEAN, and find that key problems include: (i) inconsistencies between specific areas of interest to harmonise standards and (ii) differences in the stage of development in standard-setting. Lastly, I identify suggestions to bolster efforts in standard-setting activity in ASEAN, as well as other considerations that may limit the success of regional harmonisation in standards.

INTRODUCTION

Trade has become increasingly digitised over the years, and this has been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has introduced new business models such as online merchant platforms to connect businesses to their customers, which includes local platforms such as Shopee, Lazada, and larger platforms such as Amazon. Digitalisation of trade has accelerated with the pandemic, where large sectors of the economy have been forced to halt physical operations. From 2019 to 2020, 40 million new users joined the internet in ASEAN, and more than 1 in every 3 digital service consumers started using digital services for the first time due to the pandemic. Additionally, the ASEAN digital economy’s gross merchandise value is predicted to reach US $309 billion in 2025 (Google et al., 2020).

With the proliferation of platforms to support digital trade, it is important to ensure that these platforms are able to communicate with one another. This means that systems must be interoperable and mutually compatible. Interoperability refers to the ability of digital systems to transfer data across one another. More fundamentally, it is also known as the “capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units” (International Organization for Standardization, 1993). It creates transparency, simplicity and compliance from businesses. Mutual compatibility is the mutual recognition, validation and approval of partner countries’ products, components or systems (in supply chains). Blind et al. (2013) found that being a signatory of the International Accreditation Forum Multilateral Recognition Arrangement (IAF-MLA) for the ISO 9000 quality management system standard raises bilateral trade in manufacturing products from 0.20% to 0.62%. He also stated that mutual compatibility can reduce information asymmetries between potential buyers and sellers, promoting trust with trading partners. These effects can be observed in both developed and developing countries.

One way to foster interoperability and mutual compatibility is through the creation and adoption of international digital trade standards. According to Blind (2016), standards have contributed to 0.9% of GDP growth observed in Germany and 0.8% of GDP growth in France. Furthermore, there is a positive and significant relationship between the participation in standardisation and firm performance in the manufacturing sector (Wakke et al., 2016). 

Internationally, countries are gradually observing the benefits of interoperability and mutual compatibility. In response, they are crafting and adopting digital trade standards to facilitate digital trade. This can be observed in the rise of digital trade partnerships globally, from the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Chile, Singapore and New Zealand signed in 2020, to the Japan-UK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed in 2020. ASEAN has also demonstrated strong interests in digital trade regulations. Digital trade provisions can be found in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (which all ASEAN Member States have signed) and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) (Elms, 2021). ASEAN also signed the Agreement on Electronic Commerce in 2018 (Salleh, 2018). 

However, despite the heightened interest in digital trade standards, it appears that there are gaps in the understanding of what standards need to be implemented (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 2021; techUK, 2021). This begs the question: “What are the points in which harmonisation of standards is lacking in ASEAN and the international fora?”. In this article, I identify areas which interoperability and mutual compatibility is lacking in ASEAN and internationally. This is done by reviewing ASEAN’s actions in standard-setting in electronic payments, data protection and emerging technologies. Subsequently, I suggest ways through which ASEAN can bridge this gap. Finally, other considerations that could confound the realisation of harmonisation is discussed.

AREAS WHERE HARMONISATION IS LACKING IN ASEAN AND INTERNATIONALLY

Electronic Payments (E-Payments)

A substantial increase in e-payment transactions has been observed in recent years. In a report by Google et al. (2020), Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia observed a total digital payment gross transaction value of US$620 billion in 2020, and this value is anticipated to grow by 15% to a value of US$1.2 trillion by 2025. Furthermore, India reported an estimated 70% increase in digital spending on the Unified Payments Interface (the nation’s real-time payment system) during the first seven months of 2020 (McKinsey & Company, 2020). Cross-border transactions have also risen and accelerated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the height of the pandemic in 2019, Visa reported a 7% increase in cross-border transaction volumes in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year in 2019 (Visa Inc., 2019). 

Given that the global rise in e-payments is set to continue even in a post-pandemic world, countries such as Thailand and Singapore have begun efforts to harmonise e-payment standards to facilitate cross-border transactions. In particular, Singapore and Thailand launched the linkage of their respective national PayNow and PromptPay payments systems in April 2021 (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2021). Thailand has also actively launched QR-code connectivity in cross-border payments with Japan, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia (The Star, 2021a, 2021c). 

Despite efforts to harmonise standards in e-payments, two problems are gradually surfacing in ASEAN. Firstly, the specific point in the e-payment process in which standards are harmonised is not uniformly implemented across ASEAN countries. Secondly, certain countries are faster in adopting standards, while others have not publicly announced concrete plans to do so.  Currently in ASEAN, there are two popular points of interoperability: (1) creating harmonised specifications in QR-codes and (2) integration in back-end Application Programming Interface (API) (Nautiyal et al., 2020). With harmonised QR-code specifications, consumers can make online transactions across different applications which recognise the same QR-code. The EMV® QR Code Specification for Payment Systems is a popular QR-code standard used internationally (Latge, 2020). In ASEAN, the EMV® QR Code Specification has been adopted by Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia to facilitate cross-border e-payment transactions. Meanwhile, for integrated back-end APIs, the same application needs to be used by the consumer in order to make payments with a nationally-recognised QR-code. This nationally-recognised QR-code need not conform with international standards. Such integration in back-end APIs is an emerging option for Indonesia. In 2020, WeChat Pay and Alipay announced plans to integrate their respective API to facilitate e-payments with local Indonesian banks such as CIMB Niaga, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Mandiri (The Jakarta Post, 2020a, 2020c). Due to the difference in the point at which interoperability is implemented across countries, the harmonisation of QR-code payments is likely to remain fragmented in ASEAN. 

Furthermore, not all countries in ASEAN have stepped up to adopt standards in e-payments. Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar appears to be lagging behind in this area. They have announced plans to adopt ISO 20022, a broad common financial industry message scheme for retail payment systems and large-value payment systems in which the rest of ASEAN has already adopted (ASEAN, 2021). Myanmar possesses a more active private-sector and international cooperation with the formulation of Central Bank of Myanmar Financial Network System 2 (CBM-NET2), a standard launched in 2020 which allows domestic remittances across banks and bulk payments. In this project, the Japan International Cooperation Agency has supported Myanmar in the formulation of technical guidelines and rules for the CBM-NET2 (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2020). On the other hand, despite introducing the Digital Payment Roadmap 2019-2025, Brunei Darussalam has made little mention of committing to harmonising standards in e-payments. In the absence of uniform implementation and participation in standards adoption, countries may lack the capacity and efficiency to host online transactions and scale up to facilitate higher transaction volumes. Hence, this remains a barrier to a fully-integrated cross-border online transaction framework in ASEAN.

Data Protection and Privacy

Cross-border data flows refer to the exchange of information between servers across national territories, and is crucial for consumers to access information and services as they go into digital trading. Cross-border data flows have accelerated in past years where in 2020, global internet traffic was estimated to be more than 3 zettabytes, or 3,000,000,000,000 gigabytes (World Bank, 2021). It is predicted that by 2022, global internet traffic will reach 150,000 gigabytes of traffic per second (World Bank, 2021). On the valuation of cross-border data flows, a 10% increase in bilateral trade connectivity raises goods trade by approximately 2% and trade in services by 3% (OECD, 2019). However, just as data is used for the purpose of facilitating business operations, the misuse of sensitive data remains a significant challenge for businesses and consumers. In 2018, Cambridge Analytica obtained the profiles of 30 million Facebook users to build and match psychographic profiles with only 27,000 users consenting to participate (Rosenberg et al., 2018). According to the International Business Machines Corporation, the average total cost of a data breach is US$3.86 million (International Business Machines Corporation, 2021). Hence, to support cross-border data flows, it is important to create free flows of data built on a foundation of trust, making data protection and privacy crucial enablers to cross-border data flows. 

At the moment, gaps persist in the following areas: (i) inconsistent stages of implementation of data protection laws across ASEAN member states, (ii) differences in the commitment levels of major privacy protection regulations which countries align with and (iii) inconsistent regulations in data localisation provisions within ASEAN. 

Firstly, the level of implementation of data protection laws have been inconsistent across ASEAN. Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Lao PDR have established laws and regulations in personal data protection in e-commerce. However, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia and Myanmar have yet to establish such provisions.  Brunei Darussalam indicated plans in May 2021 to work on a new law to protect individuals’ personal data which encompasses commercial and non-commercial organisations (The Star, 2021b). Cambodia enacted the Law on Electronic Commerce in 2019, otherwise known as “the E-Commerce Law”. The E-Commerce Law imposes obligations in data protection and cybersecurity. However, it lacks specificity in the definition of personal data. The E-Commerce Law defines “data” as “a group of numbers, characters, symbols, messages, images, sounds, videos, information or electronic programs that are prepared in a form suitable for use in a database or an electronic system” (Cohen et al., 2020). Furthermore, no time limits on data retention are present in the E-Commerce Law. These ambiguities have yet to be addressed, limiting the ability of effective enforcement. Lastly, Myanmar has no specific laws on data protection as of July 2021. However, they have regulations in the financial (Financial Institutions Law of 2016), pharmaceutical (Law Relating to Private Health Care Services of 2007) and telecommunications (Telecommunications Law of 2013) sector on the confidentiality of personal data (DLA Piper, 2021). 

Additionally, there are two prevailing international data privacy guidelines that different ASEAN member states are aligned with; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) and the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Both guidelines adopt a risk-based approach to data protection and security. The APEC CBPR is a voluntary mechanism intended to take a more pragmatic and flexible approach to accommodate the various economies of the APEC region (Callo-Müller, 2018). It has nine participating countries: the United States, Mexico, Japan, Canada, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Chinese Taipei and the Philippines. On the other hand, the EU GDPR applies to entities or organisations established in and outside the EU, which also applies to any data processing activities by processors within and outside of the EU. The EU GDPR is adopted by all countries in the European Union. On top of the EU GDPR, the European Commission also has the authority to determine countries outside the EU which offer an adequate level of data protection. In the Asia Pacific Region, Japan is the only country recognised by the European Commission.

Between the two, the EU GDPR has more stringent data privacy rules. The EU GDPR covers personal data that is publicly available and not collected directly from the data subject, while the APEC CBPR does not. Moreover, the EU GDPR is more comprehensive in protecting the security of data subjects and their rights. Article 32 of the EU GDPR requires the controller and processor to “take steps to ensure that any natural person acting under the authority of the controller or the processor who has access to personal data does not process (the data) except on instructions from the controller”. On the other hand, the APEC CBPR remains vague in ensuring accountability; it merely states a “useful means for a personal information controller to help ensure accountability for the personal information it holds, is to have in place a privacy management programme” (Sullivan, 2019). These are some instances where the EU GDPR demonstrates a stricter approach in addressing security risks to data subjects beyond risks posed to the data than the APEC CBPR. Meanwhile, the CBPR offers baseline standards in personal data regulations to facilitate cross border data flows. 

As a result, the lack of interoperability between the APEC CBPR and the EU GDPR limits ASEAN member states from qualifying for the EU’s adequacy decision for data flows from abroad. The Philippines and Singapore are members of the APEC CBPR while Indonesia and Thailand have respectively indicated plans for and demonstrated alignment with the EU GDPR (Kateifides et al., 2020; The Jakarta Post, 2020b). The inconsistent preferences each ASEAN member state has with aligning with data protection and privacy guidelines thus further hinders the free flow of cross-border data transfers with trust.

Lastly, conflicting data localisation regulations within ASEAN can undermine cross-border data flows. Data localisation refers to laws which require data to be stored and processed within the geographic territories of its origin (Taylor, 2020). There are negative consequences of implementing data localisation requirements. Lee-Makiyama & Lacey (2021) reported that data localisation leads to increased costs from having to build data centres. Specifically in the field of the Internet of Things (IoT) in Indonesia, data localisation reduces gross domestic product (GDP) gains by 61% and causes job losses hovering around 372,000 jobs (Lee-Makiyama & Lacey, 2021). In cloud computing services, data localisation remains an obstacle that limits the possibility of storing data entirely in the cloud and taking advantage of the Internet’s distributed infrastructure to attain economies of scale (Ryan et al., 2013). According to Scharwatt (2019), if data localisation restrictions create excessive costs, firms may exit the local market due to the inability to provide services at a low cost.  Within ASEAN, Indonesia and Vietnam have data localisation laws, where both regulations require companies to use domestic data centres to store local copies of data for law enforcement and protection (Wong, 2020). Indonesia has strong proponents of data localisation, which include data centre enterprises and trade organisations who profit off data centres (Dawn-Hiscox, 2018). These proponents have opposed the relaxation of data localisation regulations, preventing the realisation of the absence of data localisation laws within the ASEAN region.

Emerging technologies

With the rise in computing power and digital connectivity, digital technologies have rapidly evolved. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) predicts that trade costs could fall with improvements in digital technologies to produce, promote and distribute products. This could result in a yearly growth in trade by 1.8 to 2 percentage points until 2030 (World Trade Organization, 2018). The decline in trade costs can help micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) expand their operations, where the share of developing countries in global trade could rise from 46% in 2015 to 57% in 2030 (World Trade Organization, 2018). In ASEAN, Myanmar faces the highest time to import (278 hours) and cost to import (US$ 667), and highest time to export (286 hours) and cost to export (US$ 572) (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2019). With the developments in emerging technologies such as blockchain for the exchange of customs documents, countries such as Myanmar could benefit from using blockchain to reduce time and cost of processing customs documents.

Despite the benefits that ASEAN can reap from a regional adoption of emerging technologies, the lack of discussion to foster alignment between ASEAN Member States remains an obstacle to realising regional adoption. One such example of this is in blockchain, where interests are divided between fintech and trade facilitation. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have produced standards in trade facilitation. Singapore introduced TradeTrust, a platform which uses blockchain to support the exchange of electronic trade documents (Infocomm Media Development Authority, 2020). It is also based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records-compliant title transfer. In May 2019, Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding of Collaborative Joint Blockchain Logistics Pilot Project with PLMP Fintech Ltd, Singapore. A pilot to deploy PLMP Fintech’s blockchain protocol to unify standards of communication between buyers and sellers of agricultural products in Batam Island has also been planned (Asia Blockchain Review, 2019). The Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT) joined Jabatan Standards Malaysia in the National Mirror Committee on Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (aka T/C/G 15). MIGHT also focuses on energy and transportation using blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, and has plans to produce standards with the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) under T/C/G 15 (The Government of Malaysia’s Official Gateway, 2019). At the international level, ISO 307 is developing standards on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies.

On the other hand, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore have strengthened cryptocurrency regulations and digital asset platforms in recent years. For instance, Cambodia introduced the cryptocurrency Bakong in October 2020, and has partnered with Soramitsu, a Japanese technology company to use the Hyperledger Iroha blockchain framework in its operations (Hyperledger, 2020). 

Given the differing areas of focus in blockchain, efforts to regional integration of emerging technologies have been slow and inconsistent. While countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have been pursuing blockchain standards more holistically in both fintech and trade facilitation, other ASEAN Member States are either involved in one or none of the sectors for development. In particular, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam are less involved in local research and development and have yet to establish capacities to support developments in blockchain for trade. Satoshi & Chen (2021) cautioned that if there is a lack of support in digital transformation, this could worsen the digital divide in global value chains within ASEAN and internationally. Hence, it is crucial for ASEAN to begin establishing and aligning in areas of interest and specific standards in emerging technologies to reap the benefits of digital transformation.

WHAT CAN ASEAN DO TO BRIDGE THE GAP IN HARMONISATION EFFORTS?

Based on the gaps highlighted in efforts to harmonise in digital trade, ASEAN can bridge these gaps in two ways: (i) furthering dialogue discussions to harmonise standards in interoperability at baseline and (ii) research and development in capacity building.

Firstly, ASEAN can further dialogue discussions to harmonise standards and facilitate interoperability at baseline. According to a webinar by Elms et al. (2021), the DEPA between Chile, Singapore and New Zealand emphasised more dialogue with the private sector across all businesses involved in the digital economy. This has been included as a module of the DEPA, named as the “Small and Medium Enterprises Cooperation”. In the webinar, Stephanie Honey, Associate Director of the New Zealand International Business Forum, highlighted how this was the first digital trade agreement which included concrete steps to enhance private sector engagement. Beyond furthering dialogue discussion in harmonisation and creating interoperability, the private sector can ensure that the standards agreed upon regionally do not confine their innovation in the future as well. Furthermore, the private sector could assist in knowledge-building and data collection for digital trade. Currently, the lack of empirical measurements in digital trade has impeded a full comprehension of the sheer scale and policy considerations of digital trade (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & International Monetary Fund, 2017). Given the private sector’s expertise in their respective areas of digital trade, there is potential for engagement in data sharing and the collation of public and private data (where feasible for private firms) for knowledge-building. Granted in reality, successful private sector engagement is dependent on sufficient lead time and the appropriate aligned incentives for regular cooperation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016).

Secondly, research and capacity building are an important leveller for developing economies in ASEAN to remain favourable as trade partners. Capacity building programmes typically occur at the bilateral level and occasionally at the regional level. This is to accommodate the individual needs of ASEAN Member States, which differ based on where they lie on the spectrum of digital trade development. In October 2020, Australia concluded a bilateral capacity building workshop with Lao PDR in online learning sessions on MSME participation in e-commerce (ERIA, 2020). In 2019, the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN and the Mission of the United States to ASEAN conducted a regional “ASEAN’s 5G Capacity Building Workshop” to introduce developments in 5G and the international regulatory landscape (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of South Korea, 2019). Engaging with experts on best practices in sectors of the digital economy can assist in human capital development to complement the baseline levels of infrastructure required to support the digital trade standards implemented. 

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY HINDER REGIONAL HARMONISATION

The recommendations above may be hampered by various considerations: (i) political considerations and (ii) reshoring or nearshoring.

Political considerations can push countries to develop their own standards for the same interests in digital trade, spurring a rat race to gain a first-mover’s advantage. Early government intervention can help establish industry-wide technical standards, together with proprietary experience. This can grant countries the regard of defining industry standards (Robinson et al., 1994). For instance, the EU’s strong regulatory capacities compared to other competing territories in capital requirements for insurers allowed them to make the first move in pushing standards in capital requirements to international bodies. On the other hand, the stronger US regulations in Basel I for capital requirements in financial institutions gave the US a first mover’s advantage in standard-setting. This led to the EU incorporating the Basel I into the Capital Requirements Directive (1993) (Quaglia, 2014). At present, it appears that history is repeating itself in the emerging area of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The EU has proposed a new regulatory system for AI called the Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) in April 2021, the first of its kind in AI legal and ethics frameworks (Hastings, 2021).  Applying the first-mover’s advantage in the ASEAN context, a similar rat race can be observed in the development of digital identities in ASEAN. Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have fully digitised their identity systems, while Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam are piloting their digital identity systems (World Bank, 2019). Of the ASEAN Member States that have rolled out digital identity systems, Singapore and Thailand have also established digital identities for businesses. However, no public discussions have taken place between Singapore and Thailand to harmonise the two business identity systems. If such a rat race does indeed occur in standards in digital identities, the benefits of trusted identity authentication will not be realised (Ogah, 2021; Sullivan, 2018). Inefficiencies in verification will still persist.

The reshoring or nearshoring of production capacities is also a potential threat to countries who may wish to enter the global value chain. Entering the global value chain enables developing countries to upgrade their human capital and their industries. In the past, a cheap labour force was the ticket for developing countries to join in the global value chain (Satoshi & Chen, 2021). However, with the rise of automation and robotics, the opportunity cost to unskilled labour has decreased drastically. As such, the selling point for countries to enter the global value chain now hinges on the level of compatibility between local economic and business institutions with countries established in the global value chains. One effect of this is reshoring, which is the relocation of offshore operations back to a business’ home country (Weinhandl, 2018). Nearshoring, which is the relocation of business operations closer to the business’ home country could also be a potential effect (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019; Weinhandl, 2018; World Trade Organization, 2018). Reshoring and nearshoring could cause a major reshuffle of the global value chain in sectors such as the apparel industry, which Vietnam and Myanmar are highly dependent on (Satoshi & Chen, 2021). The concentration of the global value chain amongst countries who are ahead in the digital transformation space could worsen the digital divide between countries, making it even tougher for countries to build capacities and meet the minimum international standards required to facilitate digital trade. 

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have highlighted key obstacles that persist in the harmonisation of digital trade standards in e-payments, data protection and privacy, and emerging technologies. Among these obstacles, I find that the inconsistencies between specific areas of interest to harmonise standards and differences in the stage of development in standard-setting between ASEAN Member States to be key barriers before interoperability in standards is attained. Moving forward, potential research areas include navigating the geopolitical tensions between countries in standard-setting, as well as opportunities to be gained from the first-mover’s advantage developed countries may have in standard-setting.

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